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Iran too, of course, must be considered in this overall scenari~. 
Although this regionally powerful state has its own important and l~git­
imate interests, much of the argument made about why Turkey nnght 
be brought around to favor an independent Iraqi Kurdistan can also be 
made for Iran. Indeed, Turkey and Iran, who share a l~ng history ~f 
pragmatic compromise in the modem Middle East, rmgh: find ~eir 
joint agreement on and sponsorship of an independent Iraq~ Kur~lStan 
yet another reason to continue their relatively peaceful relationship. 
Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies VoL XXVII, No.3, Spring 2004 
Saudization: A Useful Tool in 
the Kingdom's Battle Against 
Unemployment? 
Robert Looney* 
If we the GCC states, had a sound economic perspective in the inter-
est of our people, problems such unemployment would never crop up. 
There would not have been issues like Kuwaitisation and Saudisation.1 
Ahmed Al:Jarallah, Editor-in-Chief, the Arah Times 
Introduction 
Saudi Arabia along with the other GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) 
countries faces a challenging set of problems that need to be addressed 
if political and military stability is to be maintained in the region. The 
first problem involves attaining and maintaining economic growth rates 
that are least sufficient to keep pace with the rise in population. For 
Saudi Arabia, low economic growth has become a chronic problem: 
Gross Domestic Product {GDP) increased by only 1.6 percent between 
1990 and 2000 while growth in the country's population grew at an 
annual rate of 2. 7 percent during that period, thus producing a declin-
ing trend in per capita income.2 
This low rate of growth cannot be attributed to a lack of capital for-
mation. In fact, the rate of investment is relatively high in Saudi Arabia. 
The Sixth Development Plan (1995-2000} for instance envisaged a total 
capital of around 472 billion riyals ($125.8 billion}, including nearly 
212.7 billion riyals ($56.7 billion) from the private sector. It had also 
*Robert E. Looney is a professor of economics, and Associate Chairman of 
the National Security Affairs department at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, CA. He has written twenty books on various aspects of develop-
ment together with articles appearing in a number of scholarly journals. 
1Ahmed AI:Jarralah, "Opinion Column.'' Arab Times, January 11, 2004. 
2Unless otherwise indicated, all economic data are from the Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency, Annual report, various issues. 
targeted an economic growth of 3.8 percent over the plan period. By 
the end of the plan, actual investment increased by around two percent 
to 481 billion riyals ($128.2 billion) including nearly 292 billion riyals 
($n8 billion} from the private sector, an increase of around 37 percent 
over the projected level. 3 • 
Thus, even though the Plan overachieved in terms of investment, it 
underachieved in terms of what really counts, real economic growth. 
The ineffectiveness of investment to sustain growth appears to be struc-
tural, stemming in part from a weakening of the linkage between pub-
lic and private expenditures together with a decline in the ability of 
public expenditures to stimulate real output! Given the inability of the 
public sector to directly stimulate real non-oil ~~tput, all of the p~essure 
to provide expanded employment opportuntties and output is now 
placed on the private sector. . . 
Job creation is then the second major problem facmg the region. 
Ironically, even though the Saudi economy is heavily dependent on 
foreign workers (4.6 million or 71 percent of t+te country's workforce), 
the unemployment rate among .,Saudis is 8.2 percent, reaching 32 
percent among younger workers: 
Finally, the third challenge relates to maintaining the pace of 
economic refonns. Here the Saudis have initiated a series of measures 
designed to attract foreign investment, deregulate many key industries 
and liberalize the economy to qualify for membership in the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), as well as to facilitate further economic 
integration with the country's fellow GCC members. 
If carried out successfully, the economic reforms should remove 
many of the constraints currently impeding growth and job creation in 
the private sector. This is critical, given the current inability of public 
expenditures to perform this task. 
The country's three main challenges, restoring rates of growth above 
that of the population, expanding job creation and implementing a 
comprehensive reform package appear to be relatively compatible -
good progress in the reform area should assure higher rates of 
~ 
3Nadim Kawach, "Saudis Need to Adopt More Reforms to Spur Growth," 
Gulf News, August 17, 2003. 
~Robert Looney, "Can Saudi Arabia Reform its Economy in Time to Head 
off Disaster?" Strategic Insights, III: 1, January 2004. 
<http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/jan/looneyjan04.asp>. 
economic growth and through that mor-e jobs. But will they be jobs for 
Saudis? Apparently the government is not confident this will be the 
case because it is simultaneously broadening and expanding its 
Saudization program - the Saudi Government appears to feel that if 
jobs cannot be created through high rates of investment then they must 
be forced through quotas. 
More formally, as implemented in Saudi Arabia, Saudization is a 
development strategy that seeks to replace foreign workers with Saudis. 
To date this has been largely accomplished through various employ-
ment quota targets. For example, the currrent guidelines of the Shura 
Council {a consultative body) dictate that 70 percent of the workforce 
mnst be Saudi by 2007, with Saudization accelerated in some industry 
sectors.5 Saudi Arabia is not alone- in adopting a program stressing 
employment for native workers over foreign.6 Kuwaitization, 
Emiratizatipn, Qatarization and Om~on are to one degree or 
another peing implemented in the neighboring GCC countries. Nor is 
Saudization new - it has been tried numerous times in the past. 
The purpose of this note is to examine the country's Saudization pro-
gram. What are its main components? How will it be implemented? 
More importantly, is Saudizaton compatible with the country's general 
approach to economic reform? 
Reforms -- The Government's Response to the 
Economy's Slowdown 
In addition to a series of new economic reforms and initiatives, the 
government's response to the country's economic problems has also 
entailed a fairly extensive set of educational, political and social 
reforms. In their totality, the reforms appear to be influenced not only 
by the deteriorating economic conditions, but also by concern that the 
current environment7 in Saudi Arabia is conducive to terrorist recruit-
ment8 and activity.9 Hopefully, the reform package as a whole will 
5Grant Smith, "Saudization: Development and Expectations Management," 
Saudi-American Forum, October 31, 2002. 
°Cf. Onn Winckler, "The Immigration Policy of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council {GCC) States," Middle Eastern Studies, 33:3,July 1997, pp. 480-493. 
7"Lack of Reform in Saudi Arabfa Even Bigger Threat than Terrorism," IPR 
Strategic Business InforTTUZtion Database, November 11, 2003. 
8Richard Beeston, "Bin Laden Finds Recruits in the New Saudi Underclass," 
Londan Times,Juiy 18, 2003. 
!!«Closed Society Breeds Terror," GulfNews,January 12, 2004. 
create a more open, transparent environment within which sn:onger 
civic institutions can develop and, in time, will increase econormc and 
political freedom and lessen the terrorist threat to th~ n~tion. 10• No doubt 
the process will be slow, 11 but there are signs that 1t 1s movmg ahead. 
Specific measures noted by the Saudi Government include:12 
Economic Reforms 
The main thrust of the new wave of economic reforms is to open up 
the economy. Not only is it hoped that efficiency will be increased 
through freer markets, but also that new jobs will be created by the 
expanded flow of foreign direct inveStment. The opening of ~e econo-
,my is also one of the main pre-requisites of WTO membership, as well 
as full integration with the GCC countries.13 : 
1. In November 2002, the Saudi government announced plans to pri-
vatize twenty major sectors. Since that announcement, Saudi telecom 
has been partially privatized. "" · 
2. The postal system is in the process of being privatized, and future 
plans include privatization o( the National Insurance Company 
(NCCI) and Saudi Arabia Airlines (SAA). 
3. A new insurance law was passed on July 14, 2003 to provide a legal 
structure governing insurance. 
4. A Copyright Law was passed on June 9, 2003 to comply with the 
provisions of the World Trade· Organization's agreement on trade 
related aspects of intellectual property rights. . 
5. A Capital Markets Law passed inJuly 2003 to regulate the Saudi 
stock market, and a governing/ oversight body is being established to 
regulate stock market activity. 
6. The energy sector has been opened up to foreign investment. 
Agreements worth more than $7 billion have been reached with 
international oil companies for investments over the next few years. 
10Cf Khalid Alnowaiser, "Terrorism in Saudi Arabia:Causes and Solutions," 
Arab News, January 10, 2004. . . 
nzvi Bar'el, "Even the Saudi Public Discourse on Reforms is Conducted m 
Secrecy,'' Haaret;:..Com, Uanuary 7, 2004). . . . " 
12"Saucli Arabia's Progress on Economic, Educational and Political Reforms, 
PR Newswire, November 7, 2003. 
1JRobert Looney, "The Gulf Co-operation Council's Cautious Ap.proach to 
Economic Integration," journal of Economic Cooperation, 24:2, April 2003, PP· 
137-16Q. 
7. A new Commercial Court System is being developed to ensure the 
efficient resolution of commercial <lisputes. 
Educational Reform and Countering Extremism 
No doubt educational reform is one of the main keys to future eco-
nomic and political success for Saudi Arabia. Recent reforms include: 
1. Textbooks and curriculums are being updated. Two pilot programs 
have been established {in Riyadh andJeddah) to experiment with new 
teaching methods, while new teacher training manuals have been 
produced. 
2. Two thousand imams who have violated prohibitions against 
preaching of intolerance have been suspended from their positions. 
3. The Ministry of Islamic Affairs has initiated a three-year program 
to educate imamsand monitor religious e~ucation to ensure that 
extremism and intolerance are purged. 
Financial Oversight 
More for anti-terrorism than economic ends, the Saudi government 
has initiated a series of new regulations covering charities and financial 
institutions: 
1. Saudi charities are currently barred from sending any funds abroad. 
2. The government has adopted new laws to combat money launder-
ing and terror financing - Rules Governing Anti Money Laundering 
and Combating Terrorist Financing, May 2003. 
3. The Kingdom has implemented all 40 recommendations regarding 
money laundering and all 8 regarding terror financing of the interna-
tional Fmancial Action Task Force {FATF). 
4. On September 21-25, 2003 Saudi Arabia hosted a team from the 
F ATF to perform a joint evaluation on the procedures the Kingdom 
has taken to combat money laundering and terror financing. 
5. Saudi Arabia's new laws in this are now among the strictest in the 
world. 
6. A Financial Intelligence Unit has been established to track suspi-
cious flows of funds. 
7. Accounts have been frozen and suspects arrested. 
17 
8. Saudi Arabia and the United States established a joint task force in 
Amrust 2003 to deal with terror financing. This task force operates as 
0 
an intetrrated unit and brings the resources of both governments 
0 
together. This task force is in addition to the joint task force estab-
lis..lied in May 2003, to fight terrorism. 
Building Civic Participation 
This is a relatively new area for Saudi reforms and only a very first 
beginning is underway: 
1. A center for national dialogue has 'been established to bring togeth-
er thinkers to publicly discuss issues of concern to Saudi Arabia and 
to provide recommendations for dealing with the challenges the coun-
try faces in the economic, social and political arenas. 
2. An association for journalists has been established, and associations 
for other professional and trade groups are expected to be established. 
3. An independent, private human rights organization has been estab-
lished. ,,-
Broadening Political Participation 
As with civic participation, political participation is in its infancy in 
Saudi Arabia. Y~t a beginning has been made: 
1. On October 13, 2003 the cabinet approved plans to streamline 
local and municipal governments, including the establishment of 
Municipal Councils in which half the members are elected and half 
appointed. 
2. Student councils are being set up in public schools to begin edu-
cating young Saudis about civic responsibilities and participatory 
governance. 
Saudization 
Running parallel to these reforms is the country's Saudization pro-
gram, focused on three main goals:1' 
"Grant Smith, "Saudization: Development and Expectations Management," 
Saudi-American Forum, October 31, 2002. 
lQ 
1. Increase employment for Saudi nationals across all sectors of the 
domestic economy. 
2. Reduce and reverse over-reliance on overseas foreign workers. 
3. Recapture and reinvest income which otherwise would have flowed 
overseas as remittances to foreign worker home countries. Over the 
last 10 years expatriate workers in the kingdom have remitted about 
SR585.4 billion.15 
Achieving these goals will be an extremely difficult task. For one 
thing, such efforts in the past have met little success. For example, the 
Sixth Development Plan {1995-2000) targeted the creation of nearly 
319,500 jobs for Saudis through replacement of foreigners, but despite 
the ·efforts noted above, the number of foreign workers grew by around 
58, 400.16 • .. 
In addition the country's demographics present a sever.e challenge. 
In 2004 one. out of every two Saudis was less than 15 years of age, and 
an estima.ted 60 percent of the population is less than 20 years old. The 
education system has largely failed to prepare the country's youth for 
jobs requiring technical expertise. Compounding this problem is that 
many graduates refuse ~to.-take--assignments that are considered com-
monly as menial, further enlarging the ranks of approximately six mil-
lion expatriate workers. As noted above, this is occurring in an envi-
ronment where youth unemployment may be reaching 30 percent. In 
reality, barely 2 percent of Saudi youths who attend Saudi University 
and/ or technical institutes are fully qualified to assume demanding 
posts. An estimated 50 percent of Saudi youth drop out of primary 
school. All of these factors severely constrain the available recruitment 
pool for businesses. 11 
Current Efforts at Saudization 
The Saudization program's particular focus is on youth where unem-
ployment reaches 32 percent compared to 8.2 percent among Saudis as 
a whole. In addition, the government has taken the initiative to increase 
participation of Saudi women in the labor market where currently only 
15"Expats Remitted SR585 Billion in 10 Years," Arab News,January 10, 2004. 
16Nadim Kawach, "Saudis Need to Adopt More Reforms to Spur Growth," 
Gulf News, August 17, 2003. 
'Joseph Kechichian, "The Direction of a New Generation in Saudi Arabia," 
GulfNews,January 8, 2004. 
10 
10.2 percent of women now hold jobs. These demographic realities 
place intense pressure on Saudi authorities to create at least 160, 000 
jobs annually. 
While Saudization in one form of another has been around for years, 
its pace, along with other reform efforts has recently picked up. In the 
mid-1990s: 
1. A law was issued requiring private businesses employing more than 
20 people to increase the number of Saudi nationals in their work-
force by 5 percent every year. 
2. The employment of foreigners irt twenty-two, mostly administrative 
professions was banned. 
3. The government increased fees on the ,recruitment of expatriates, 
with the money going into a special fund 'set up to help "nationalize" 
jobs. 
More recent initiatives have included: 
1. In 2001, the Ministry of Lab.or and Social Affairs targeted a goal for 
2002 of 25 percent Saudization in the private sector. This was in line 
with the goal defined by the current Five Year Development Plan 
(2000-2005) that seeks to provide 817 ,000 jobs for Saudis by creating 
new opportuD.ities or by replacing expatriates with Saudi citizens. The 
move was also in line with a government policy which calls for 
increasing Saudi manpower in the private sector by five percent 
annually. 
2. The current set of Saudization laws were enacted in 2002. 
Companies with 20 or more employees are now required to employ 
Saudis up to at least 30 percent of their workforce. 
3. In January of 2003 the Shura Council began to apply Saudization 
metrics to companies working in the Kingdom that are directly owned 
by Saudi Aramco as well as those implementing Aramco projects. 
The Saudization level of contractors must now be included in annual 
performance reports submitted by the Ministry of Petroleum and 
Mineral Resources. While they may increase the complexity of for-
eign competitive bids for oil and gas projects, from the Council's per 
spective the measures move bid selection toward achieving the cou-
OJ"\ 
try' s national labor force interests. 18 
4. Early in 2003, the Saudi Ministry of Labor ordered the accelerated 
Saudization of the 9,771 bank jobs held by expatriates. 
5. InJuly 2003, the government announced its decision to reduce the 
number of expatriate workers to 20 percent of the total population in 
a decade, in order to open up jobs for its nationals. 
Finally Saudi Aramco is assisting the implementation of Saudization 
by holding the companies it concludes contracts with to certain quotas 
of Saudis: 35 percent for construction companies, 50 percent for servic-
es companies and 60 percent for importers, industrialists and engineer-
ing o:ffices.19 For their part, in 2002 Aramco established a center to train 
Saudis working for contractors. The program is geared to upgrading 
professional skills and teaching specific skills particularly in the areas of 
drilling and oil well maintenance.20 
While . Aramco is ·developing innovative programs to facilitate the 
Saudization of the labor force, the predominance of Saudization 
employment elsewhere in the kingdom is still through the use some sort 
of quota system or by directly banning expatriates from working in cer-
tain activities. Currently 34 areas are closed to expatriate workers 
including:21 training managers, public relations officers, administrative 
assistants, purchase managers, secretaries, operators, warehouse super-
visors, debt collectors, customer service accountants, tellers, postmen, 
data handlers, librarians, book sellers, ticket kiosk keepers, taxi drivers, 
auto salesman, janitors, internal mail handlers and tour guides. 
Looking into the future, these recent Saudization initiatives imply that 
up to three million foreigners living and working in Saudi Arabia may 
have to leave the kingdom in the next decade. According to a February 
2003 notice by the Manpower Council:22 
1. The number of foreign workers and their families must not exceed 
20 percent of the Saudi population by 2013. In this regard the num-
18Grant Smith, "Saudization: Development and Expectations Management," 
Saudi-American Forum, October 31, 2002. 
111«Saudi Aramco Spearheads Saudization Drive of Contracting Firms," Saudi 
&onomic Survey,January 8, 2004. 
20"Saudi Paper Says Aramco Plans to Saudize 3,600 Jobs in Oil Industry," 
BBC Monitoring International R.eports, November 3, 2003. 
2~asim Ali, "GCC Insights: Challenges Facing Economies in 2004," Gulf 
News,January 7, 2004. 
220mar Hasan, "Three Million Expats Face the Axe in Saudi Arabia," Ageru:e 
France Presse, February 4, 2003. ?1 
: ! 
ber of foreigners in the Kingdom is currently estimated at between six 
to seven million, compared to around 17 million Saudis. Based on the 
current Saudi population growth rate of about 3.2 percent annually, 
Saudis are expected to reach 23 million by 2013 and accordingly for-
eigners must not exceed 4.5 million. 
2. The decision also stipulates a quota system for foreign nationalities 
in which any single nationality must not exceed 10 percent of the total 
expatriates. 
3. The System will particularly hit Asians from India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh and the Philippines in addition to Arabs from Egypt, 
Sudan and Syria, whose numbers exceed the required 10 percent. 
Impact on the Economy , 
Like any major policy initiative, Saudization clearly creates some dis-
turbances, with some sectors like transport23 anticipating a catastrophe. 
The ultimate goal of development and hopefully higher growth comes 
with a cost in the form of short term transitional disruption.24 It is a bit 
too early to gauge the imp~ct of Saudization on the economy at this 
point. There are two main .. concerns. First, many firms may feel that 
Saudization will reduce their competitiveness and for that reason may 
decide to leave the Kingdom for a more business friendly environment. 
These would most likely be firms in the service sectors such as banking 
where in early 2003, the Saudi Ministry of Labor ordered the acceler-
ated Saudization of the 9~771 bank jobs held by expatriates. Many 
bankers spoke out stating that the Saudization of all banking jobs would 
likely cause a brain drain and a loss of business to other regional bank-
ing centers, particularly Dubai.25 The country's poor regulatory envi-
ronment only compounds this problem with a reportedly 2,500 Saudi 
companies opening up shop in Dubai, rather than in the Kingdom.26 
23"Trucking Industry in Saudi Hurt by Saudization," Middle East North Africa 
Financial Network, November 30, 2003. 
24Grant Smith, "Saudization: Development and Expectations Management," 
Saudi-American Forum, October 31, 2002. 
25Grant Smith, "Saudization: Development and Expectations Management," 
Saudi-American Forum, October 31, 2002. 
26Kate Kuxford, "Poor Regulatory Environment in Saudi Arabia Leads Local 
Companies to Set up in UAE," World Markets Analysis, December 19, 2003. 
The Arab WOrld Competitiveness Report, 2002-2003 lists several indus-
tries, among them acyclic hydrocarbons, insulated wire or cable, poly-
mers 'C>r ethylene, and structures and parts of structures, as current 
underachievers that might be vulnerable to a loss in competitiveness 
stemming from Saudization. These industries might have an especially 
difficult time absorbing an increased share of Saudi workers. On the 
other hand, Saudization advocates such as Saudi economist Ihsan 
Bu-Hulaiga contend that because only 15 percent of the expatriates can 
be classified as skilled, the new Saudization quotas will not create a 
vacuum in the domestic labor market. 'IT His contention is that the 
domestic market is currently saturated with foreigners, some of whom 
are unemployed, unskilled and or illiterate. They simply compete with 
Saudi job-seekers to force down wages. 
In contrast, many businessmen have been lukewarm concerning the 
quotas and targets established by the Sau~ation program. In particu-
lar they have called for a review of the Cabinet resolution setting the 
Saudization quotas that all private businesses. must abide by, especially 
the section requiring that any establishment employing more than 20 
workers must increase the rate of Saudization by 5 percent per annum. 
Many businessmen correctly contend this may not always be. possible 
given the fact that the supply of Saudi workers is not enough to cover 
the needs of the private sector. Currently, in early 2004, the required 
Saudization quota for companies is 30 percent.28 
Perhaps in a response to private sector concerns the Shoura Council 
indicated in early 2004 that it may approve a new law that will allow 
employers to fire Saudi works if they prove inefficient, subject to the 
condition that the dismissal is not arbitrary. The Ministry of Labor and 
Social Affairs is also contemplating29 the reformulation of regulations 
that could check the outflow of Saudis working with the private sector -
- workers wishing to join another private establishment would be 
required to present a clearance certificate from their previous employ-
ers. While no doubt favored by firms, restrictions of this type are not 
21Quoted in Omar Hasan, "Three Million Expats Face the Axe in Saudi 
Arabia," Agence France Presse, February 4, 2003. 
28"Shoura Council Reviewing New Labor Law," Arab News,January 23, 2004. 
29"Shoura Council Reviewing New Labor Law," Arab News, January 23, 2004. 
C)') 
well advised since they are inconsistent with the functioning of efficient 
labor markets. 
The second main area of impact from Saudization may be a reduction 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Kingdom. Here foreign firms 
may feel that Saudization not only puts them at a disadvantage 
compared to their foreign competitors, but that the whole Saudization 
program itself is unpredictable, with rules and quotas changing 
randomly. This element, combined with increased concern over 
domestic terrorist . violence may drastically reduce the inflows of 
FDI. Perhaps concern over Saudization's impact on foreign investors 
underlies the Kingdom's recent decision to reduce the tax on foreign 
investors from 45 to 20 percent.30 
Incentive-Based Saudization Strategies 
Several important lessons come out of the experiences of the 
other GCC countries in creating employment opportunity for 
national workers:31 
1. The capital intensity of die oil sector makes it extremely difficult for 
that sector to create an adequate number of jobs for nationals and still 
remain competitive. 
2. Developing new employment opportunities rather than substituting 
local workers for foreign is the only long term solution for accommo-
dating a growing labor force;. 
3. It is extremely difficult to create additional jobs without expanded 
volumes of foreign direct investment. 
4. Training new entrants for likely job openings is the key to a suc-
cessful national employment policy. 
5. A largely expatriate workforce remitting large proportions of their 
earnings makes sustaining high levels of domestic demand difficult. 
30"Saudi Arabia Cuts Income Tax on Foreign Investors," Khaleej Times, 
January 14, 2004. . 
31CF. Robert E. Looney, Manpower Policies and Development in the Persian Gulf 
Region, {Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1994); Cf. Onn Winckler, "The 
Immigration Policy of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC} States," Middle 
Eastern Studies, 33:3,July 1997, pp. 480-493. 
() ,j 
As with the other GCC countries, most of Saudi Arabia's new entrants 
to the workforce will have to go into the private sector. In this regard 
job creation for locals is much easier in a growing economy, 
perhaps relying on significant inflows of foreign direct investment 
and technology. 
Saudi Arabia's manpower problem is similar to that of the other GCC 
countries in that there is a pronounced mismatch between education 
and employability. To avoid a loss of competitiveness in an economy 
possessing a pool of skilled and relatively cheap foreign labor Saudis 
will have to be trained and or retrained in competencies needed in the 
market place. 
The R-0le of Market Forces and ·Incentives 
In more general terms, instead of quotas the Saudization should be 
implemented more through market forces and incentives. Saudization 
should pot be approached as a zero silln problem, but instead 
implemented in a growth oriented environment assisted with expanded 
foreign investment, induced in part through an expanded and reformed 
education/training ""program. In short, Saudization should be 
implemented in a manner that provides jobs for Saudi nationals in an 
environment characterized by increased competitiveness and strong 
non-oil growth. Here economic theory32 provides some general propo-
sitions and guidelines for possible action: 
1. From the perspective of private sector firms, the demand for Saudi 
native workers is inversely related to the cost of their hiring and fir-
ing. It is also inversely related to the cost of employing low-skilled 
expatriate workers. Since a reduction in the number of low-skilled 
employees likely reduces the marginal productivity of national work-
ers, an increase in the cost of employing low skilled workers would 
reduce the demand not only for these workers but also for Saudi 
workers. 
2. If skilled expatriate workers are sufficiently substitutable with Saudi 
workers, then demand for Saudis should be positively related to the 
cost of employing skilled expatriates - increases in these costs would 
lead firms to reduce their demand for skilled expatriate workers and 
32Assuming a Cobb-Douglas Production function incorporating technological 
change and limited substitutability between Saudi and expatriate workers. 
to substitute them with national workers. 
3. Finally, the demand for Saudi workers is also positively related to 
their level of human capital, the stock of capital and technology 
because increases in these factors should raise the return on employ-
ing an additional national worker. 
4. The supply of national workers to the private sector should depend 
on the compensation relative to their reservation wages (the minimum 
wage one is willing to accept for their work). Reservation wages in . 
turn are detennined by the wage, social benefit and employment poli-
cies of the government If the public sector provides relatively high 
wages, social benefits and job .security to nationals, then the reserva-
tion wage and benefits will be relatively high for the private sector. 
From these supply and demand considerations several policies can be 
adopted to increase job opportunities for Saudi workers in the private 
sector. These may be grouped into three broad categories depending 
on whether they directly affect: (a) wages and employment costs, (b) 
acquisition of human capital or {c) investment in capital and technolo-
gy. These policies are structural and market-based, in contrast to quan-
titative measures, such as job quotas, which may adversely affect com-
petitiveness and non-oil growth by raising costs and limiting employ-
ment flexibility. 
Policies Affecting Wages· and Employment Costs 
Reducing the relatively high wages in the public sector is likely to 
lower the reservation wage and increase the willingness of nationals to 
acquire skills or human capital valuable to private sector employers. 
Announcing and enforcing the strict limits on public sector hiring is 
likely to further lower the reservation wage by decreasing the likelihood 
that the public sector will act as the employer of first and last resort for 
nationals. 
Separating wages and social benefits in the public sector and provid-
ing benefits to all working nationals-not just to those employed in the t 
public sector-is likely to reduce the incentive for nationals to seek pub- ~ 
lie sector employment and lower the reservation wage to the private ! 
sector. Moreover, giving time specific subsidies for the employment of I 
nationals will likely increase private sector demand for them by lower- I 





than the employment benefit for the policy to be welfare improving. 
(These subsidies could be financed, for instance, by fees or income truces 
on skilled expatriate workers). 
Relatively higher firing costs for nationals, including lengthy appeal 
and investigation of dismissals, mises their relative cost of employment, 
thus reducing demand. Therefore, establishing a clear set of rules for the 
appeal of dismissals, including fines or penalties associated with wrong-
ful dismissals, and a mechanism for the rapid resolution of appeals is 
likely to lower the relative cost of employing Saudis, and reduce the dis-
parity in labor mobility between Saudi and expatriate workers across 
sectors. 
If skilled expatriate workers are sufficiently substitutable with Saudi 
workers, then increasing the relative cost of hiring skilled expatriate 
workers such as by imposing income taxes or fees on. the employment 
of skilled expatriates, is likely to result in substitution away from skilled 
expatriates and towards nationals (assumllig that the employer will 
cover the cost of paying the income tax of his expatriate workers}. Such 
taxes or foes should only be applied to skilled expatriates and not to 
low-skilled expatriates because the latter complement the productivity 
of nationals. If truces or fees are applied to low-skilled expatriate work-
ers then the cost of hiring them will increase and the demand for 
national workers is likely to increase. 
Skill Development 
Enhancing the human capital of Saudis and the acquisition of skills 
that are valuable to the private sector is likely to increase demand and 
employment To this end, providing education including vocational 
training, reforming school curricula encouraging firms to establish 
internships, awarding scholarships as well as targeted training vouchers 
and fostering self employment will likely build necessary skills and 
expertise among prospective national workers. 
In order to compete on a global level and on the strength of the 
national labor force, the Saudi economy will probably have to diversi-
fy, and that will include employment in more hazardous industries for 
Saudi nationals. The construction sector for example, one of the most 
dangerous industries, will require thousands of skilled Saudi workers to 
fulfill its Saudization target This will necessitate significant improve-
ments in safety and health conditions in the workplace in order to 
attract Saudis. Similarly in the oil and petrochemical industries, which 
contribute up to 90 percent of the Kingdom's income, a comprehensive 
occupational safety and health strateS?' must b~ ~sta~lished.33 • 
Here subsidies might be used to entice Saudis mto Jobs through train-
ing co~tracts. The government could play an active role in assisting the 
process. The newly created Human Development Resources Fund34 
should play a greatly expanded role in assisting this effort. For ~xam~le 
employers could be responsible for providing the necessary skills tram-
ing, while the employee will commit to completing the progr~. If the 
employee leaves before training ends, he or she will have to reunb~e 
the cost of the training to the employers, which would then be partially 
refunded to the Fund. 
For its part in November 2003, the ~ovemment alloc~ted SR3.7 bil-
lion for the training of more than 100,000 young Saudis. Plans are to 
establish 20 technical colleges capable of accommodating 60,000 
trainees and 39 technical training institutes designed for 40, 000 stu-
dents. There are also tentative plans for~xpanded vocational training in 
the military. These plans look for the military to admit 10, 000 trainees 
annually. The first three ·months will be allocated for basic military 
training during which time the skills of the trainees will be examined to 
identify suitable professions. Technical training will be given in the last 
nine months and the trainees will be given professional certificates.35 
Investment in Capital ·ud Knowledge 
Facilitating the adoption of new technologies and the accumulation of 
capital is also likely to increase private sector demand and employment 
of Saudi workers by raising their productivity. In this regard, the 
establishment of regional knowledge and technology intensive clusters .• 
of industries might be of great help. Moreover, shifts in government !· 
expenditure away from welfare-state type activities towards economic i 
services, and research and development should lead to higher produc- ~: 
tivity and investment i 
33lntemational Labor Organization, Saudi Arabia: Managing Markets in 
Transition (Geneva, ILO, forthcoming 2004). 
3'Human Resources Development Fund, 
<http://www.hrdf.org.sa/ver2/index.htm>. . . 
35P.K. Abdul Ghafour, "Govt. Allocates SR3.7b for Trammg of Young 
Saudis," Arab News, November 5, 2003. 
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Several innovative approaches have successfully drawn on a number 
of aspects of the above described outline. An area of great potential for 
the training of Saudis for skilled positions is the country's offset pro-
gram. The Economic Offset Program is a Saudi government initiative 
designed to achieve the following goals within the framework of foreign 
investment for major civil and defense projects: {a} economic diversifi-
cation, (b) manpower development, (c) strategic self-sufficiency, (d) 
technology transfer, and (e) investment opportunities. 
BAE Systems is a major company that participates in the offset 
program -- it is one of the largest private sector employers of Saudis in 
the Kingdom. In December 2003 the company announced that Saudi 
employees constituted 52 percent of their workforce {2,386 out of 
4,579). Increased Saudi employment came as a result. of.the continued 
recruitment of young Saudis to join trairµng programs to become 
aircraft technicians~ engineers and other specialists. After periods of 
intensive inStruction the Saudis then work along side expatriates, many 
of whom have 25 or more years of experience. 
Saudi Arabia is the center of operations in the Middle East for BAE 
Systems and the company envisages Saudis playing an important role 
in developing the company's business throughout the Arab World.36 
Perhaps the most innovative area of Saudization has originated with 
the government itself. The country's Human Resources Development 
Fund {HRDF) provides grants for qualifying, training and recruiting 
Saudis for work in the private sector. After workers are trained and 
qualified, HRD F can subsidize a percentage of the salaries of those 
skilled workers hired by the private sector. Funding for these activities 
comes from a SR150 fee levied on work permits. Early signs suggest 
that the program is rapidly catching on with employers.37 Given public 
education's limited capacity38 to develop skilled professionals, much of 
36"Saudis Comprise more than Half BAE Systems Workforce," AME Info, 
January W, 2004. 
3'Molouk Y. Ba-Isa, "3,500 Saudis Recruited under HRDF Program," Arab 
News, June 9, 2002. 
38Ihsan Buhulaiga, "Challenges and Prospects of the Saudi Labor Market," 
Arab News, January 20, 2004. 
this task will have to be undertaken by the private sector. The HRDF 
is certainly a step in the right direction and no doubt its funding should 
be expanded to reflect its contribution to the country's future. 
Costs and Benefits 
The costs of achieving Saudization are no doubt considerable - train-
ing, recruiting, etc. are real expenses that must be borne for the 
program's success. On the other hand, these are costs that any aspiring 
country must accept as part of the development process. They would 
not necessarily put the Kingdom at any competitive disadvantage 
considering the fact that competing countries are bearing essentially the 
same burdens. 
While critics of Saudization tend to focus on these costs, little 
attention is paid to the benefits ass~dated with the program. A 
notable exception is Kevin Taecker.39 Taecker's approach attempts 
to quantify the shifts in domestic demand associated with various 
national/ expatriate compositions of the "Workforce. The idea is straight-
forward: with Saudization :i;nemey that would be remitted (9% of GDP 
or $14 billion in 1999 alo~e) to families outside the Kingdom is now 
spent domestically. 
Not only do expatriates spend a smaller percentage of their income 
domesticaliy, but perhaps more importantly it is for a fairly narrow and 
meager basket of goods and services, leading to a very low domestic 
expenditure multiplier of OiK That is for every 1000 riyals earned and 
spent locally by an expatriate another 450 in income is produced as this 
spending circulates through the economy. For Saudis the expenditure :t 
multiplier is estimated at 2.5 or 1,500 in extra income generated for i 
each 1000 riyals of Saudi expenditures. I 
As noted, in 1999 expatriate worker remittances were around $14 bil- ;1 
lion. Assuming that expatriates send one-half of their incomes out of the ~ 
country, this would suggest these workers earned around $28 billion. ~ 
Taking the effects of the difference in Saudi and expatriate household I 
expenditure multipliers, the total annual cost of relying so extensively n 
on expatriate labor are around $47 billion {the differences in multipliers I 
2.5 - 0.8 times $28 billion). 1 
39Kevin R Taecker, "Myths and Realities About Unemployment in Saudi 
Arabia," Saudi-American Forum, March 30, 2003. I 
These factors begin to hit home when one makes a couple of simple 
calculations. If met, the Saudization goal of reducing the number of 
expatriates by 2% annually for the period 1999-2004 (The Sixth Plan 
Period) would shift $2. 7 billion of income from expatriates to Saudis. By 
2004 this income spent locally would raise annual incomes by $4.6 bil-
lion. As Taecker notes:"° 
The Saudi private sector will be the main beneficiary. The bulk of 
these effects will be reflected in the form of increased purchases of 
goods and services form local business. The $4.6 billion would repre-
sent more than 6.80/o of 1999 private sector GDP- a real and sub-
stantial reward for doing their part to meet the plan's modest goals .... 
Thus, there is a virtuous' economic cycle implicit in successful 
Saudization. By leading the economy overall to higher economic mul-
tipliers it stimulates business growth and hiring, pushing the economy 
even higher. · . · 
Looked at in thisJight, Saudization, though benefiting the private sec-
tor, is essentially a pu:filic good, replete with free rider problems - some -
firms will not voluntarily Saudize, but rather simply reap the benefits of 
expanding domestic markets provided by those firms who actively 
increase Saudi employment In this case, rather than simply imposing 
mandatory quotas on firms, the government might consider several 
incentive based strategies. 
Taxes. Determine industry norms for Saudization and pay propor-
tional bonuses to firms above the norm and set proportional truces on 
those firms below the norm. 
Allow 'lrading in Offsets. This approach would be similar to that 
used in the United States by the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency11 to deal with emissions. In the Saudi context limits could be 
set on the number of expatriates in a certain industry. Thus if an indus-
try is at its limit and a new firm wished to enter that line of business 
it would have to negotiate a deal with an existing business to hire 
qualified Saudis, or pay for training programs to make more Saudis 
Wfaecker, op. cit., p. 8. 
41Cf.J. Barkley Rosser and Martina Rosser, Comparatiue Economics in a 
Transforming J%rld Economy, (Chicago: Irwin, 1996}, p. 37. 
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is certainly a step in the right direction and no doubt its funding should 
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These factors begin to hit home when one makes a couple of simple 
calculations. If met, the Saudization goal of reducing the number of 
expatriates by 20/o annually for the period 1999-2-004 (The Sixth Plan 
Period} would shift $2. 7 billion of income from expatriates to Saudis. By 
2004 this income spent locally would raise annual incomes by $4.6 bil-
lion. As Taecker notes:"° 
The Saudi private sector will be the main beneficiary. The bulk of 
these effects will be reflected in the form of incr..eased purchases of 
goods and services form local business. The $4.6 billion would repre-
sent more than 6.8% of 1999 private sector GDP- a real and sub-
stantial reward for doing their part to meet the plan's modest goals .... 
Thus, there is a virtuous. economic cycle implicit in successful 
Saudization. By leading the economy overall to higher economic mul-
tipliers it stimulates business growth and hiring, pushing the economy 
even h.igher. · . , · 
Looked at in thisJ~ Saudization, though benefiting the private sec-
tor, is essentially apufifkg0()d, replete with free rider problems - some -
firms will not voluntarily Saudize, but rather simply reap the benefits of 
expanding domestic markets provided by those firms who actively 
increase Saudi employment In this case, rather than simply imposing 
mandatory quotas on firms, the government might consider several 
incentive based strategies. 
Taxes. Determine industry norms for Saudization and pay propor-
tional bonuses to firms above the norm and set proportional taxes on 
those firms below the norm. 
Allow Thading in Offsets. This approach would be similar to that 
used in the United States by the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency11 to deal with emissions. In the Saudi context limits could be 
set on the number of expatriates in a certain industry. Thus if an indus-
try is at its limit and a new firm wished to· enter that line of .business 
it would have to negotiate a deal with an existing business to hire 
qualified Saudis, or pay for training programs to make more Saudis 
.'"Taecker, op. cit., p. 8. 
'
1Cf.J. Barkley Rosser and Martina Rosser, Comparatiue Economics in a 
Transforming World Economy, (Chicago: Irwin, 1996), p. 37. 
t'\1 
employable in the industry. In the United States environmental exam-
ple such a deal is known as an "offset." The same principle could be 
applied in Saudi Arabia to gradually increase the proportion of Saudis 
in the workforce. 
No doubt there are other similar incentive based plans that could 
facilitate the increased employment of Saudi nationals without hamper-
ing economic growth. 
Conclusions 
Saudization does not have to be incompatible with some of the 
Kingdom•s new economic refoims geared towards increasing the econ-
omy's diversity, competitiveness, growth potential and employment 
generation capacity. For one thing, th~ larger domestic markets stem-
ming from the replacement of expatriates by Saudis should complete 
the country's reform efforts in that it should: 
1. Facilitate growth in the non-oil segihent of the economy. 
2. Provide a stimulus to ~e-private sector to invest more in the domes-
tic economy. 
3. Create conditions for attracting foreign investment 
For its part, the government's strategy for expanding employment 
opportunities, while complementing other reform efforts, should be 
built around the followingi\ctions: 
Increasing the relative attractiveness of working in the private 
sector by lowering the wage differential between the public and pri-
vate sectors; making social benefits available to all working nationals. .. 
irrespective of sector of employment; and announcing strict limits on ~ 
public sector employment. i 
&! 
~ 
Reducing disparities in labor mobility by creating a level playing I 
field between the hiring and firing national workers vis-a-vis expatri- ~ 
ate workers. I 
Encouraging skill acquisition among nationals by strengthening 
educational and vocational trading, providing time-specific incen-
tives, such as subsidies and scholarships, and promoting self 
employment I I 
" 
Facilitating improvements in productivity and investment in 
capital by outsourcing government services, and extending majority 
foreign ownership in non-free trade wne areas. 
Using price based rather than quantity based market interven-
tions by charging, for instance, fees for employing or income taxes on 
skilled expatriate workers. 
